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I    INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a homeowner habitually enjoys sunbathing in his or her backyard, 
protected by a high fence from prying eyes, including those of an adolescent 
neighbour. In times past such homeowners could be assured that they might go 
about their activities without a threat to their privacy. However, recent years have 
seen technological advances in the development of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(‘UAVs’), also known colloquially as drones, that have allowed them to become 
reduced in size, complexity and price. UAVs today include models retailing to 
the public for less than $350 and with an ease of operation that enables them to 
serve as mobile platforms for miniature cameras.1 These machines now mean that 
for individuals like the posited homeowner’s adolescent neighbour, barriers such 
as high fences no longer constitute insuperable obstacles to their voyeuristic 
endeavours. Moreover, ease of access to the internet and video sharing websites 
provides a ready means of sharing any recordings made with such cameras with a 
wide audience. Persons in the homeowner’s position might understandably seek 
some form of redress for such egregious invasions of their privacy. Other than 
some form of self-help,2 what alternative measures may be available? 
Under Australian law this problem yields no easy answer. In this country,  
a fractured landscape of common law, Commonwealth and state/territory 
legislation provides piecemeal protection against invasions of privacy by cameras 
                                                
*  LLB (Hons I), PhD. Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology. 
1  Asher Moses, ‘Privacy Fears as Drones Move into Mainstream’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 18 
February 2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/privacy-fears-as-drones-move-
into-mainstream-20130217-2elcj.html>. See also Renee Viellaris, ‘Unmanned Aircraft Bought Online 
Being Deployed to Monitor Private and Public Property’, Courier Mail (online), 31 August 2013 
<http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/unmanned-aircraft-bought-online-being-deployed-to-
monitor-private-and-public-property/story-fnihsrf2-1226707858451>. 
2  Such as may be encouraged by bounties for shooting down drones, as at least one American town has 
been reported as considering: Keith Coffman, ‘Don’t Like Drones? Folks in Deer Trail, Colorado Mull 
Paying Citizens to Shoot Them Down’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 18 July 2013 
<http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/dont-like-drones-folks-in-deer-trail-colorado-
mull-paying-citizens-to-shoot-them-down-20130718-2q5rd.html#ixzz2ZMSXOsCH>. 
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mounted on UAVs. It is timely, at what may be regarded as the early days of the 
drone age, to consider these laws and to identify deficiencies that may need to be 
addressed lest, to quote words that are as apt today as they were when written 
over 120 years ago, ‘modern enterprise and invention … through invasions upon 
[their] privacy, [subject victims] to mental pain and distress, far greater than 
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.’3 
 
II    UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 
A    Uses 
A UAV may be regarded as any aircraft that operates without a human in 
direct contact with it.4 The first use of a UAV in modern times was when the 
United States Navy commissioned the design of an ‘aerial torpedo’ for use 
against German U-boats during World War I.5 The Curtiss Aeroplane Company 
produced the Speed-Scout, a UAV designed to be launched from naval vessels 
carrying a 1000lb bomb. The first successful flight of a Speed-Scout was on 6 
March 1918.6 
In more recent times, UAVs have entered the public consciousness through 
their use in military operations in countries such as Afghanistan.7 The qualities 
that make UAVs valuable for such deployments include:  
• their wide range of applications (including surveillance and as a weapons 
platform); 
• their efficiency in terms of accuracy of surveillance and weaponry;8  
• the cost saving in not requiring a pilot and reducing the need for conflict 
on the ground; 
• their long range and reach; and 
  
                                                
3  Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘A Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193, 196. 
4  Brendan Gogarty and Meredith Hagger, ‘The Laws of Man over Vehicles Unmanned: the Legal Response 
to Robotic Revolution on Sea, Land and Air’ (2008) 19 Journal of Law, Information and Science 73, 74. 
5  Roland E Weibel and R John Hansman, ‘Safety Considerations for Operation of Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles in the National Airspace System’ (Report No ICAT-2005-1, International Centre for Air 
Transportation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 2005) 19. 
6  Laurence R Newcome, Unmanned Aviation: A Brief History of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004), cited in Weibel and Hansman, above n 5, 19. 
7  Gogarty and Hagger, above n 4, 82–5. The authors provide an interesting examination of the use of 
UAVs by the military as well as the emerging uses of UAVs in civilian life. 
8  Although this may not always have been the case. See, eg, Justin Elliott, ‘Washington’s Silence Creates 
Doubt on Deaths’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 23 June 2012 
<http://www.smh.com.au/world/washingtons-silence-creates-doubt-on-deaths-20120622-20tjy.html>. 
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• their acceptance by the public as preferable to conflict on the ground 
with the corresponding risk to friendly troops.9  
As Weibel and Hansman have observed, the success of military UAV 
deployments and desire on the part of UAV manufacturers for expanded markets 
has led to an increasing interest for UAVs to perform a variety of roles in civilian 
life.10 The broad range of potential civil and commercial applications includes:11 
• Remote sensing including pipeline and power line monitoring,  
volcanic sensing, mapping,12 meteorology, and geological, agricultural, 
vegetation13 and wildlife14 surveying; 
• Disaster response such as flood and geological disaster monitoring;15 
• Surveillance for law enforcement, traffic monitoring,16 coastal/maritime 
patrol and border patrol;17 
• Search and rescue of individuals lost or stranded on land or at sea;18 
• Transport of food, medicine and other cargoes;19 
• Communications relay of the internet and mobile phone service;20 
                                                
9  See, eg, Brendan Gogarty and Isabel Robinson, ‘Unmanned Vehicles: A (Rebooted) History, Background 
and Current State of Art’ (2012) 21 Journal of Law, Information and Science 1; Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
‘Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal Operations’ (2012) 21 Journal of Law, Information 
and Science 116, 136. 
10  Weibel and Hansman, above n 5, 21. 
11  Ibid 22. See also Federal Aviation Administration, ‘Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap’ (Report, Department of Transport (United 
States), 7 November 2013) <http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/media/UAS_Roadmap_2013.pdf>. 
12  See, eg, Li Changchun et al, ‘The Research on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Remote Sensing and its 
Applications’ (Paper presented at 2nd International Conference on Advanced Computer Control, 
Shenyang, China, 27–29 March 2010) 644–7. 
13  See, eg, Jose A J Berni et al, ‘Thermal and Narrowband Multispectral Remote Sensing for Vegetation 
Monitoring from an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle’ (2009) 47 IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote 
Sensing 722. 
14  See, eg, George Pierce Jones IV, Leonard G Pearlstine and H Franklin Percival, ‘An Assessment of Small 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for Wildlife Research’ (2006) 34 Wildlife Society Bulletin 750. 
15  See, eg, Changchun et al, above n 12. 
16  See, eg, B Coifman et al, ‘Roadway Traffic Monitoring from an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle’ (2006) 153 
IEEE Intelligent Transport Systems 11. 
17  See, eg, Matthew DeGarmo and Gregory M Nelson, ‘Prospective Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations 
in the Future National Airspace System’ (Paper presented at 4th Aviation Technology, Integration and 
Operations Forum, Chicago, United States, 20–22 September 2004) 4–5. 
18  See, eg, Patrick Doherty and Piotr Rudol, ‘A UAV Search and Rescue Scenario with Human Body 
Detection and Geolocalization’ (Paper presented at 20th Australian Joint Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence, Gold Coast, Australia, 2–6 December 2007). 
19  See, eg, Aleksandra Faust et al, ‘Aerial Suspended Cargo Delivery through Reinforcement Learning’ 
(Technical Report No TR13-001, Adaptive Motion Planning Research Group, University of New Mexico, 
7 August 2013). <https://www.cs.unm.edu/amprg/Publications/afaustTR13-001.pdf>; Jay Price 
McClatchy, ‘Unmanned Cargo Helicopters Prove Worth in Afghanistan, Leading Way to Civilian Uses’, 
Miami Herald (online), 6 May 2013 <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/06/3378859_drone-cargo-
helicopters-prove.html>. 
20  See, eg, DeGarmo and Nelson, above n 17, 3–4. 
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• Delivery for diverse purposes such as fire-fighting and crop dusting; 
• Entertainment including cinematography and advertising; and 
• Broadcasting by television and radio organisations.21 
This list is not exhaustive. For example, UAVs may also be used for purely 
recreational purposes. However, the list serves to highlight some important 
points. UAVs may be used in a civilian sphere by government agencies, 
corporations or individuals. For example, a government department may use a 
UAV in lieu of more costly fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters to monitor areas in 
flood or drought, as well as to detect and/or fight bushfires or in police tactical 
operations. Television and radio stations may use UAVs in lieu of helicopters for 
traffic reports and other reporting purposes, and film and advertising companies 
may use UAVs for filming aerial shots for their productions. By contrast, 
individuals may use UAVs simply for recreational purposes – model aircraft 
flying in a local park or reserve is not an uncommon sight. 
While a UAV may be intentionally deployed on one of the above 
applications, it may also in the course of that deployment unintentionally capture 
images of individuals involved in activities that they would prefer not to be seen 
by others, whether legal (but embarrassing) or illegal. Thus, for example, a UAV 
scanning bushland for a lost bushwalker, monitoring crops or filming landscapes 
for a television or movie production might inadvertently capture images of a 
couple having sexual relations or someone urinating amongst the foliage. 
Alternatively, it might capture images of a person or persons involved in the 
cultivation of illegal drugs. By the same token, a UAV used for recreational 
purposes might include a person seeking to satisfy their voyeuristic urges such as 
the posited adolescent intentionally spying on someone sunbathing in his or her 
backyard or on a public beach. Such accidental or deliberate invasions of privacy 
may raise difficult questions in terms of current Australian privacy laws, and 
provide a useful setting for exploring the nuances and inconsistencies in the law, 
and to identify those areas that may be in need of reform. 
 
B    Regulation of UAVs 
The use of civilian air space is regulated by the Civil Aviation Safety 
Regulations 1998 (Cth). These regulations provide rules for users of all aircraft 
and also aim to maintain the safety of those on the ground. In 2002 a new part 
101 was inserted enacting rules governing the use of UAVs, the first time in the 
world that such regulations had been enacted. 
These provisions are primarily concerned with the safe operation of UAVs. 
There is a general prohibition on unsafe operation, that is, operation of an 
unmanned aircraft in a way that creates a hazard to another aircraft, person or 
                                                
21  Ibid 6–7. 
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property.22 This is supported by more specific provisions that apply to unmanned 
aircraft generally, including stipulations that:  
• unmanned aircraft cannot be operated higher than 400 feet above ground 
level within three nautical miles of an aerodrome unless permission is 
given;23  
• the maximum operating height of an unmanned aircraft is 400 feet above 
ground level unless approved;24  
• a person cannot cause a thing to be dropped or discharged from an 
unmanned aircraft in a way that creates a hazard to another aircraft, a 
person or property;25 and  
• an unmanned aircraft can only be operated in clear weather.26 
Divisions 101.F.1–4 separates UAVs into large UAVs (defined as inter alia 
an unmanned aeroplane with a launch mass greater than 150 kilograms or an 
unmanned rotorcraft with a launch mass greater than 100 kilograms),27 micro 
UAVs (defined as a UAV with a gross weight of 100 grams or less)28 and small 
UAVs (defined as a UAV that is neither large nor micro).29 These divisions only 
apply to the operation of large UAVs and small UAVs which are operated for 
purposes other than sport or recreation. It does not apply to a UAV while it is 
being operated by a person who keeps it in sight nor to micro UAVs.30 To give 
these definitions some context, the UAVs of a similar size to those used by the 
United States in military actions (such as the eight-metre long Predator drone)31 
would constitute large UAVs while most UAVs available for purchase from 
stores or online by members of the public for use as a camera platform, or those 
used by television stations to cover sports like cricket and football, would be 
considered to be small UAVs. 
Under these regulations, a UAV cannot be legally operated within 30 metres 
of a person who is not involved in the operation of the UAV32 and must not be 
operated over populous areas33 (which means areas which have a sufficient 
density of population for some aspect of the operation, or some event that might 
happen during the operation – in particular, a fault in, or failure of, the aircraft – 
to pose an unreasonable risk to the life, safety or property of somebody who is in 
                                                
22  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.055(1). 
23  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.075. 
24  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.085. 
25  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.090. 
26  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.095. 
27  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.240 (definition of ‘large UAV’). 
28  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.240 (definition of ‘micro UAV’). 
29  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.240 (definition of ‘small UAV’). 
30  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.235. 
31  See Gogarty and Robinson, above n 9, 9. 
32  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.245. 
33  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.280. 
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the area but is not connected with the operation).34 Further, a small UAV can only 
operate in areas outside those approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
(‘CASA’) if, where the UAV has operated more than 400 feet above ground 
level, the operator has CASA’s approval to do so and the UAV stays clear of 
populous areas.35 This offence is one of strict liability. Large UAVs require 
airworthiness certification and may only be operated with CASA’s approval.36 
The Deputy Director of CASA, Terry Farquharson, has acknowledged the 
formidable challenges that the agency is facing in trying to regulate UAVs. In a 
speech in July 2013, 37  he noted that there were 30 holders of operator’s 
certificates for large UAVs, double the number in the previous year, and that the 
number of model aircraft being used was impossible to estimate as they were 
easily accessible in the open market and their operation required no training or 
certification. It was further estimated that over 90 per cent of UAVs operating in 
Australia weighed less than seven kilograms and were becoming impossible to 
regulate. 38  In an earlier speech, 39  the Director of CASA, John McCormick, 
outlined plans to introduce a new part 102 into the Civil Aviation Safety 
Regulations 1998 (Cth) to bring the regulations concerning UAVs (which would 
be renamed Remotely Piloted Aircraft (‘RPA’)) in line with other regulatory 
                                                
34  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.025. 
35  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.250. 
36  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 101.275. 
37  Terry Farquharson, ‘RPAs (Drones) in Civil Airspace and Challenges for CASA’ (Speech delivered at the 
Sir Richard Williams Foundation, National Gallery of Australia, 3 July 2013) <http://www.casa.gov.au/ 
scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD:1380917481:pc=PC_101593>. 
38  A recent illustration of the challenges posed by UAVs was an incident in 2010 in which a Pacific Blue 
737-800 passenger jet at Perth airport had a near miss with a UAV operated by a person or persons 
unknown which had taken off from a nearby park and fortunately was caught in the jet’s wash rather than 
being sucked into one of the jet’s engines: ibid. More recently, a UAV known as a quad-copter with a 
camera mounted to its underside crashed into the Sydney Harbour Bridge before the start of the 
International Navy Fleet Review: Belinda Kontominas, ‘Mystery Drone Collides with Sydney Harbour 
Bridge’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 4 October 2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/mystery-
drone-collides-with-sydney-harbour-bridge-20131004-2uzks.html>. It was consequently discovered that 
it was being operated by an enthusiast who was testing new equipment on his UAV at night when he lost 
control of the UAV, which hit the bridge, flew over traffic and crashed in front of a train: Colin Cosier, 
‘Crashed Drone’s Extraordinary Journey’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 26 November 2013 
<http://media.smh.com.au/featured/crashed-drones-extraordinary-journey-4955165.html>. In the United 
States, a quad-copter operated by ABC7 New York was being flown above busy Manhattan streets when 
it clipped a building and crashed onto the footpath, narrowly missing passers-by: ‘Small Drone Crashes 
into New York City Sidewalk’, Huffington Post (online), 2 October 2013 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/02/drone-crash-new-york-city_n_4033566.html>. 
39  John McCormick, ‘Development of UAS in Civil Airspace and Challenges for CASA’ (Speech delivered 
at the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems Australia, Melbourne, 25 February 2013) 
<http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_101374>. 
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bodies such as the United States Federal Aviation Administration.40 While CASA 
has acknowledged that privacy concerns go hand in hand with civil use of UAVs, 
it has taken the attitude that that is an issue for the Privacy Commissioner rather 
than for CASA, which is instead focused on safety issues. 
 
III    PRIVACY LAW IN AUSTRALIA:  
AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE? 
Privacy law in Australia is a patchwork of common law and statute at both 
Commonwealth and state/territory levels. There have also been recommendations 
for a legislative response made by two law reform commissions that, if ever 
enacted, would have application to invasions of privacy facilitated by cameras 
mounted on UAVs. 
 
A    Personal Privacy and the Australian Common Law 
For many decades it was believed that Australian common law provided no 
protection for personal privacy per se, based on obiter in the High Court case 
Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor.41 In this respect, 
the Australian common law mirrored a longstanding position in the United 
Kingdom. 42  However, in 2001 the High Court in Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd43 had an opportunity to reconsider the 
position and declared that the common understanding of the Victoria Park obiter 
was erroneous and that there was no impediment to Australian common law 
evolving to recognise an independent cause of action for invasions of privacy. 
Justices Gummow and Hayne (with whom Gaudron J agreed) approved the 
analysis offered by Professor W L Morison: 
The plaintiff in the case was a racecourse proprietor [which] was not seeking 
privacy for [its] race meetings as such, [it] was seeking a protection which would 
enable [it] to sell the rights to a particular kind of publicity. [Its] sensitivity was 
‘pocket book’ sensitivity … The independent questions of the rights of a plaintiff 
who is genuinely seeking seclusion from surveillance and communication of what 
surveillance reveals, it may be argued, should be regarded as open to review in 
future cases even by courts bound by the High Court decision.44 
                                                
40  In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration has granted approval for certain uses of civilian 
UAVs but has resisted approving the use of self-flying vehicles: Federal Aviation Administration, above 
n 11. The report addresses privacy concerns to the extent of a proposal to declare six testing sites for 
drones, with each site required to develop and make public a privacy policy. While these test sites’ 
policies are ‘not intended to predetermine the long-term policy and regulatory framework’ they will ‘help 
inform the dialogue’: at 12. 
41  (1937) 58 CLR 479, 496 (Latham CJ), 521 (Evatt J) (‘Victoria Park’). 
42  Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344, 372 (Megarry V-C); Kaye v Robertson 
(1990) 19 IPR 147, 150 (Glidewell LJ), 154 (Bingham LJ), 155 (Leggatt LJ).  
43  (2001) 208 CLR 199 (‘Lenah Game Meats’). 
44  Ibid 249 [108], citing W L Morison, ‘Report on the Law of Privacy’ (Paper No 170, Parliamentary 
Library, Parliament of New South Wales, 1973) [12]. 
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In response to the submission that Australian courts had not developed ‘an 
enforceable right to privacy’ because of what generally was taken to follow from 
the failure of the plaintiff’s appeal in Victoria Park, their Honours declared that 
‘Victoria Park does not stand in the path of the development of such a cause of 
action.’45 Similarly, Callinan J concluded that: 
It seems to me that, having regard to current conditions in this country, and 
developments of the law in other common law jurisdictions, the time is ripe for 
consideration whether a tort of invasion of privacy should be recognised in this 
country, or whether the legislatures should be left to determine whether provisions 
for a remedy for it should be made.46 
His Honour cautioned, however, that ‘[a]ny principles for an Australian tort 
of privacy would need to be worked out on a case by case basis in a distinctly 
Australian context.’47 
Justices Gummow and Hayne (with Gaudron J agreeing) and Callinan 
referred to the experience in the United States, where it has been recognised that 
privacy is protected by four separate torts, which were described by William 
Prosser as ‘tied together by the common name, but otherwise [having] almost 
nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of 
the plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, “to be let alone”’:48 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his [or her] private 
affairs.  
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.  
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.  
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.49 
However, it has been suggested that both portrayal in a false light and 
appropriation represent ‘a questionable application of “privacy” to circumstances 
that have only the most tenuous relationship to the concept’.50 
Further, as Callinan J warned: 
Australian courts need to be wary about applying any decisions of the courts of the 
United States in which any asserted right to publication is involved, as the 
question on the merits will usually be bound up with an assertion of constitutional 
rights under the First Amendment.51 
The ‘distinctly Australian context’52 referred to by Callinan J would include 
an Australian tort of invasion of privacy being subject to the constitutional 
                                                
45  Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 248 [106]. 
46  Ibid 328 [335] (citations omitted). 
47  Ibid 328 [332]. 
48  William Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 389. 
49  Ibid. See also Time Inc v Hill, 385 US 374, 383 n 7 (1967); Cox Broadcasting Corporation v Cohn, 420 
US 469, 488 (1975); American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) § 652A. 
50  Raymond Wacks, Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (Oxford University Press, 1989) 35–6. 
51  Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 328 [331]. 
52  Ibid 328 [332]. 
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guarantee of freedom of communication on government or political matters.53 In 
addition, any common law protection of personal privacy would need to preserve 
coherency in the law by not encroaching upon the established domain of an 
established cause of action.54 
As Justices Gummow and Hayne (with whom Gaudron J agreed) pointed out: 
[I]n Australia, one or more of the four invasions of privacy, to which reference has 
been made, in many instances would be actionable at general law under 
recognised causes of action. Injurious falsehood, defamation (particularly in those 
jurisdictions where, by statute, truth of itself is not a complete defence), 
confidential information and trade secrets (in particular, as extended to 
information respecting the personal affairs and private life of the plaintiff, and the 
activities of eavesdroppers and the like), passing-off (as extended to include false 
representations of sponsorship or endorsement), the tort of conspiracy, the 
intentional infliction of harm to the individual based in Wilkinson v Downton and 
what may be a developing tort of harassment, and the action on the case for 
nuisance constituted by watching or besetting the plaintiff’s premises, come to 
mind.55  
Chief Justice Gleeson described the interest providing the foundation for a 
tort protecting privacy as human dignity.56 By contrast, Gummow and Hayne JJ 
(Gaudron J agreeing) thought that the ‘fundamental value of personal autonomy’ 
provided the relevant basis.57 Their Honours further opined that of the torts 
recognised in the United States, unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion and 
disclosure of private facts come closest to reflecting a concern for this privacy 
interest.58 Those categories provide a useful framework for examining invasions 
of privacy by use of cameras mounted on UAVs. 
 
B    Unreasonable Intrusions 
A UAV may be used for intentional invasions of privacy such as where a 
camera is mounted on a UAV for the deliberate purpose of spying on a neighbour 
or engaging in some other voyeuristic activity. However, UAVs may also lead to 
unintentional intrusions such as where the purpose of the UAV is to monitor 
traffic, crops or wildlife, or to search for a lost bushwalker but accidentally 
captures images of an individual or individuals engaging in activities that they 
would prefer not be revealed to others. 
                                                
53  See also Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Lenah Game Meats (2001) 
208 CLR 199, 224 [35] (Gleeson CJ). 
54  See, eg, Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 581 [55] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and 
Callinan JJ); Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 335 [28] (Gleeson CJ). 
55  Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 255 [123] (citations omitted). These comments predated the 
adoption of truth alone as a defence in all jurisdictions: Civil Laws (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 135; 
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 25; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 22; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 25; 
Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 23; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 25; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 25; 
Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 25. 
56  Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226 [43]. 
57  Ibid 256 [125], citing Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967, 1001 [126] (Sedley LJ). 
58  Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 256 [125]. 
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Depending on the circumstances, intrusion on a person’s privacy by use of a 
UAV may give rise to a number of established causes of action such as trespass 
to land and private nuisance. However, neither of these provides a panacea for 
such an intrusion. A brief examination of these established causes of action and 
their respective limitations is warranted, together with a consideration of a 
potential distinct intrusion tort that may protect privacy in the circumstances. 
It has long been established that the right to sue for trespass to land is not 
limited to interferences on the surface of the land alone but extends to infractions 
of the air space above the land.59 However, that right does not extend to the 
heavens (as suggested by the old Latin maxim cuius est solum ejus est usque ad 
coelum et ad inferos)60 but instead is limited to the height of reasonable usage. 
Thus, in Bernstein, Griffiths J remarked: 
The problem is to balance the rights of an owner to enjoy the use of his land 
against the rights of the general public to take advantage of all that science now 
offers in the use of air space. This balance is in my judgment best struck in our 
present society by restricting the rights of an owner in the air space above his land 
to such height as is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land … 
and declaring that above that height he has no greater rights in the air space than 
any other member of the public.61  
Accordingly, no trespass was committed by a Cessna aircraft flying over the 
plaintiff’s property to take an aerial photograph of it. The court was unmoved by 
the plaintiff’s arguments concerning the exploitative nature of the defendant’s 
conduct, nor the possibility that the photographs might fall into the wrong hands. 
As noted, UAVs operate at a height that is lower than normal aviation. At the 
same time they may reach a height above that which would be necessary for the 
ordinary use and enjoyment of land, and therefore fly in airspace in which a 
landowner has no greater rights than any other member of the public, including 
the operator of the UAV. Moreover, trespass to land has a number of other 
deficiencies making it unsuitable as a means of addressing the risk of invasion of 
privacy by use of a UAV. From the outset, a plaintiff may not bring a claim 
unless he or she has the requisite title to sue, which is not limited to ownership 
but includes exclusive possession of the land.62 Thus, while it might help the 
backyard sunbather if he or she owned or leased the premises, it would not be 
available to a person who was not able to exercise control over the property such 
as a guest or other visitor staying on the premises. Nor, as Griffiths J recognised 
in Bernstein, would it assist even the owner or tenant if the aircraft stayed in the 
airspace above an adjoining property.63  
                                                
59  Bernstein v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479 (‘Bernstein’). 
60  Bury v Pope (1586) Cro Eliz 118; 78 ER 375. 
61  Ibid 488. 
62  Newington v Windeyer (1985) 3 NSWLR 555, 563 (McHugh JA). 
63  Bernstein [1978] QB 479, 488. 
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Naturally, trespass to land also offers no avenue for redress by a person who 
is subjected to surveillance by a camera mounted on a UAV while that person is 
in a public place, such as a public beach or street or in bushland. 
In Bernstein, Griffiths J suggested that constant surveillance of the plaintiff’s 
land by air flights over the land may be actionable as private nuisance. 64 
Violation of a person’s human dignity or personal autonomy by watching or 
filming him or her by means of a camera mounted on a UAV may constitute  
an unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land, although it has 
been held that ‘besetting’ alone may not be sufficient.65 However, ‘besetting’ 
combined with noise or some other objectionable behaviour may be sufficient.66 
The reasonableness of such an interference is a question that depends upon the 
circumstances of the individual case. If, for example, the extent of the backyard 
sunbather’s complaint was that he or she was disturbed by a combination of 
being filmed and the noise made by his or her neighbour’s UAV while it was 
being flown in the airspace above the adjoining property or in airspace above a 
height of reasonable usage for the purposes of trespass to land, then factors such 
as the locality, duration, time of day, frequency and extent of the interference 
would be taken into account when balancing the sunbather’s property rights 
against the desire of the neighbour to fly the UAV. It is a question of degree:  
a significant interference for a short period of time may be judged to be 
unreasonable, as may be a slight interference for a considerable period of time.67  
Like trespass, however, an action on the case for nuisance would be 
unavailable without the requisite interest in the land (possession or an immediate 
right to possession) providing title to sue.68 It would therefore offer no recourse to 
a person who was only visiting the property or in a public place like a beach or 
bushland. 
One lower court has ventured towards recognising a distinct cause of action 
for an unreasonable intrusion69 but there has as yet been no appellate court 
decision to accept the invitation extended by the High Court in Lenah Game 
Meats. In Grosse v Purvis,70 the plaintiff sued the defendant, her former lover 
who had been stalking her, on a number of grounds including invasion of 
privacy. Senior Judge Skoien of the District Court of Queensland referred to the 
American tort of unreasonable intrusion71 and took what his Honour described as 
                                                
64  Ibid 489. 
65  Ward, Lock & Co Ltd v Operative Printers’ Assistants’ Society (1906) 22 TLR 327, 329 (Vaughan 
Williams LJ). 
66  Sid Ross Agency Pty Ltd v Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia [1971] 1 NSWLR 760, 
767 (Mason JA); Hubbard v Pitt [1976] 1 QB 142, 175 (Lord Denning MR). 
67  Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 683, 691 (Veale J). 
68  Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KB 141, 151 (Barnes P), 154 (Fletcher Moulton LJ). 
69  Grosse v Purvis (2003) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706. 
70  (2003) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706. 
71  See American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) § 652B.  
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the ‘bold step … the first step in the country’72 of recognising a claim where the 
following elements were established: 
(a) a willed act by the defendant, 
(b) which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff, 
(c) in a manner which would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities, 
(d) and which causes the plaintiff detriment in the form of mental physiological 
or emotional harm or distress or which prevents or hinders the plaintiff from 
doing an act which she is lawfully entitled to do.73 
Subsequent decisions have been less willing to embrace such a tort.74 
In Grosse v Purvis, Skoien SJ saw an unreasonable intrusion tort as a 
counterpart to the criminal offence of stalking under section 359B of the 
Criminal Code (Qld). His Honour decided that it was unnecessary to decide 
whether there could be liability in the case of negligent acts since in the 
circumstances he was considering, the defendant had intended his various acts.75 
Similarly, while he considered that the defence of public interest should be 
available in an appropriate case, this was not an issue he needed to decide since 
there was no such possibility involved in that case. An appeal was lodged against 
his Honour’s ruling but the case was settled before the appeal was heard. 
Senior Judge Skoien purported to base his formulation on the American tort 
of unreasonable intrusion, but there are differences between the two. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the American tort in these terms:  
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another person or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability 
to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person.76  
This tort is committed where there is an intention to engage in conduct to 
achieve a particular outcome, namely the intrusion upon solitude or seclusion of 
another. Accordingly, an individual may be liable where he or she uses a camera 
with the intention of capturing particular images.77 No liability arises, however, 
where a camera accidentally captures an image since such an outcome would 
amount to an unintentional intrusion. 
                                                
72  Grosse v Purvis (2003) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 187 [442].  
73  Ibid 64 187 [444]. Senior Judge Skoien supported the judgment by holding that while other torts that had 
been committed, including trespass to person, trespass to land and intentional infliction of harm based on 
Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, none of these covered the entirety of the defendant’s behaviour in 
the same way that the tort of privacy would. 
74  See, eg, Kalaba v Commonwealth [2004] FCA 763, [6] (Heerey J); Chan v Sellwood [2009] NSWSC 
1335, [37] (Davies J); Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, 35–6 [167]–[168] (Ashley JA), 106–7 [447]–
[450] (Neave JA). Cf Gee v Burger [2009] NSWSC 149, [53] where McLaughlin AsJ described an 
unreasonable intrusion tort as ‘arguable.’ 
75  Grosse v Purvis (2003) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 187 [446]. 
76  American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) § 652B. 
77  Koeppel v Speirs, 808 NW 2d 177 (Iowa Sup Ct, 2011) (covert camera in unisex toilet). 
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By contrast, in his Honour’s formulation, Skoien SJ separated intention and 
intrusion into two separate elements, namely: (a) a willed act by the defendant (b) 
which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff. In other words, 
unlike the American tort, the defendant must only willingly do an act, rather than 
willingly intrude upon privacy or seclusion. The significance may be illustrated 
by reference to images captured by a camera mounted on a UAV. The 
hypothetical adolescent neighbour flying his UAV in order to capture images of 
the sunbathing householder would incur liability in terms of both section 652B of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (since it would be an intentional intrusion upon 
the solitude or seclusion of the householder) and Senior Judge Skoien’s 
formulation (since it would be a willed act which intruded upon privacy or 
seclusion of the householder). On the other hand, it could be argued that where a 
UAV operated by a television station for the purposes of conducting traffic 
reports flew over the householder’s property and accidentally broadcast to its 
viewers video of the householder sunbathing, there may be liability under Senior 
Judge Skoien’s formulation. This would be because the operation of the UAV 
would constitute the willed act (satisfying the first element), which would have 
the consequence of intruding upon the householder’s privacy or seclusion 
(satisfying the second element). However, as already noted, no liability would 
arise for the purposes of the American tort in such a case since such an accidental 
capture would amount to an unintentional intrusion upon the householder’s 
solitude or seclusion. 
If, instead, Australian courts preferred to adopt a formulation of an 
unreasonable intrusion tort that is more closely aligned with the American tort, a 
question may still remain as to what constitutes an ‘intentional intrusion’. As 
Peter Cane has remarked, intention is a concept that is known to both tort and 
criminal law, although the meaning assigned to the term is not necessarily the 
same.78 This is because the focus of criminal law is on the agent of the crime 
whereas tort law tends to focus on the interests of the victim as much as the 
conduct of the tortfeasor.79 Consequently, tort law often regards intention as 
including recklessness, in the sense of a conscious indifference to the risk of the 
outcome occurring.80 Cane suggested that this is because ‘the person who intends 
that their conduct should produce a particular consequence, and the person who 
is reckless as to whether their conduct will produce a particular consequence, 
both engage in the conduct deliberately.’81  
According to Cane, it is the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate 
behaviour that has the prime significance for tort law. The question would 
therefore be, in the example posed of the television station operating the UAV 
that accidentally streams to its viewers video of the sunbathing householder, 
                                                
78  Peter Cane, ‘Mens Rea in Tort Law’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 533, 534. 
79  Ibid 553. 
80  Ibid 545. 
81  Ibid 536. 
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whether the station would be regarded as having been reckless in the sense of 
being consciously indifferent to the risk of such an event occurring. It may be 
relevant to such question if some reasonable precaution would have prevented 
the event, such as delaying the broadcasting of video to viewers until the camera 
was over its intended object (namely the traffic situation) or recording video 
instead of live streaming so that any images of private activities may be removed 
before broadcast. 
Senior Judge Skoien’s third element may be thought similar to a requirement 
in the American tort. It is also similar to the test of private matters suggested by 
Gleeson CJ in Lenah Game Meats: 
An activity is not private simply because it is not done in public. It does not 
suffice to make an act private that, because it occurs on private property, it has 
such measure of protection from the public gaze as the characteristics of the 
property, the nature of the activity, the locality, and the disposition of the property 
owner combine to afford. Certain kinds of information about a person, such as 
information relating to health, personal relationships, or finances, may be easy to 
identify as private; as may certain kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, 
applying contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would understand to 
be meant to be unobserved. The requirement that disclosure or observation of 
information or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a useful practical test of what is 
private.82 
Accordingly, the mere fact that a householder might be sunbathing in his or 
her backyard does not necessarily mean that that act is private if that backyard is 
open to view from taller buildings that surround it. Similarly, if the person were 
sunbathing on a public beach, that activity may not be regarded as private. The 
circumstances of the location must be taken into account in determining whether 
a reasonable person, applying contemporary standards, would understand that the 
activities were meant to be unobserved. However, there may be a point of 
distinction with Senior Judge Skoien’s formulation, which refers to an intrusion 
‘in a manner which would considered highly offensive to a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities’.83 In other words, on this formulation it is the manner of 
the intrusion that is to be offensive as contrasted with the intrusion itself, as 
suggested by the American tort. It may be possible to argue that even if activities 
in the backyard were visible from other buildings or if a person was sunbathing 
on a public beach and open to view with the naked eye, being filmed by a 
camera, and possibly recorded for playback, is an entirely different thing.84 In this 
sense the manner of the intrusion that is being filmed by camera as opposed to 
being seen by the naked eye, might be regarded as highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. 
                                                
82  Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 226 [42] (emphasis added). Cf Schifano v Greene County 
Greyhound Park Inc, 624 So 2d 178 (Ala Sup Ct, 1993) (photograph used in a promotional brochure 
without reference to or written permission of the subjects was not an invasion of privacy where the photo 
was not offensive and the subjects did not provide ‘unique value’). 
83  Grosse v Purvis (2003) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 187 [444] (emphasis added). 
84  Cf Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41. 
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The fourth element in Senior Judge Skoien’s formulation is also problematic. 
His Honour saw a plaintiff’s suffering of embarrassment, hurt, distress and, a 
fortiori, post-traumatic stress disorder as an actionable detriment.85 However, an 
unreasonable intrusion is in the nature of a direct, intentional event: the plaintiff’s 
dignity is affronted as soon as the intrusion takes place. Under current Australian 
thinking, this would suggest that an invasion of privacy by unreasonable 
intrusion is more akin to a trespass rather than an action on the case. 
Consequently, it should be actionable per se rather than requiring a plaintiff to 
prove damage of any kind.86 
The American tort recognises a defence of public interest in the case of an 
unreasonable intrusion. The possibility of such defence was acknowledged by 
Skoien SJ. Such a defence would seem appropriate where a camera mounted on a 
UAV filmed a nefarious activity, such as drug cultivation in a forest or perhaps 
drug dealing inside a home, presuming it would be possible for such activities to 
be regarded as being private in the first place. 
 
C    Disclosure of Private Facts 
While an intrusion may affront a person’s dignity or encroach upon that 
person’s autonomy, it is possible that even greater damage may be inflicted by a 
disclosure of private facts to a wider audience.  
Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts outlines how the 
American tort provides a remedy for such conduct in these terms: ‘one person 
gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another which is matter 
of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) is not 
a legitimate concern to the public.’87  
Some American jurisdictions apply an alternative formulation in the form of: 
(1) a public rather than private disclosure; (2) of private rather than public facts; 
(3) which would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities; and (4) which is not outweighed by a sufficient legitimate 
public interest in disclosure.88 
Courts in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand have now recognised a 
cause of action for public disclosure, although different routes were taken to 
achieve that outcome. The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting89 
cited advances in technology, changing societal attitudes and a greater focus on 
human rights at an international level as providing a strong impetus for such a 
development. The Court considered the appropriate response was to develop the 
common law to recognise a tort in terms similar to the American disclosure tort. 
                                                
85  Grosse v Purvis (2003) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706, 64 187 [445]. 
86  See Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231. 
87  American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) § 652D.  
88  See William Prosser et al (eds), Prosser and Keeton on Torts (West Publishing, 5th ed, 1984) 856–7. 
89  [2005] 1 NZLR 1. 
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This development now seems to have the approval of at least a majority of the 
Supreme Court of New Zealand.90 
By contrast, in the United Kingdom, under the influence of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (UK) c 42, the action for breach of confidence has evolved into an 
action which may be described as one for ‘misuse of private information’,91 one 
manifestation of which may protect an individual’s privacy.92 The Human Rights 
Act 1998 (UK) c 42 obliges English courts to strike a balance between two rights 
guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights:93 the right to 
privacy (article 8) and the right to free expression (article 10). Many of the cases 
have considered this balance in the context of breaches of privacy by the media. 
In that context the balancing exercise has been expressed in terms of a two stage 
enquiry: 
(1) a determination of whether the person publishing the information knows 
or ought to know that there is a reasonable expectation the information in 
question will be kept confidential;94 and  
(2) once that threshold was reached, balancing, as a matter of fact and 
degree, the interest of the recipients in publishing the information, giving 
full recognition to the importance of free expression and with a measure 
of latitude shown for the practical exigencies of journalism such as the 
fact that editorial decisions must often be made in the context of tight 
deadlines.95  
If they were to extend a comparable protection against disclosure of private 
facts, Australian courts would likewise face a choice between developing the 
common law in an approach akin to that taken in New Zealand, perhaps by 
reference to the American tort, or applying and/or developing an existing cause 
of action in a similar fashion to the approach taken in the United Kingdom.  
In Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,96 a case involving a media 
defendant publishing the name and other identifying particulars of a rape victim, 
Hampel J of the Victorian County Court acknowledged that she was also taking a 
‘bold step’ by adopting the former approach and recognising for the first time in 
                                                
90  Television New Zealand Ltd v Rogers [2008] 2 NZLR 277, 296 [48] (Blanchard J), 300 [63] (Tipping J), 
309 [104]–[105] (McGrath J). 
91  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, 464–5 [14] (Lord Nicholls). 
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Australia a distinct tort protecting against public disclosure. Her Honour did not 
think that the absence of previous authority was a bar to such a development 
because otherwise the capacity of the common law to develop to reflect 
contemporary values would be ‘stultified’.97 Her Honour also did not think it 
necessary to state an exhaustive definition of the cause of action and instead 
considered it sufficient to hold that an action could lie where there was an 
unjustified publication of information that the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation would remain private.  
As noted, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Lenah Game Meats98 thought that 
‘confidential information … (in particular, as extended to information respecting 
the personal affairs and private life of the plaintiff, and the activities of 
eavesdroppers and the like)’ may provide sufficient redress for some instances of 
invasion of privacy. Chief Justice Gleeson similarly expressed support for this 
view.99 Subsequently, the Victorian Court of Appeal in Giller v Procopets held 
that a generalised tort of unjustified invasion of privacy should not be recognised 
where there was an existing cause of action that could be developed and adapted 
to meet new circumstances.100 Such a position accords with the need to preserve 
coherency in the law, a requirement of Australian law noted above. 
The traditional formulation of the cause of action for breach of confidence 
has three essential elements:  
(a) the information must have the necessary quality of confidence;  
(b) the information must be communicated in circumstances importing an 
obligation of confidence; and 
(c) there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment 
of the communicator.101  
Information which is recognised as satisfying the first element was originally 
in the nature of business or trade secrets102 but was subsequently extended  
to embrace protection for personal secrets, such as domestic confidences  
passing between a husband and wife during marriage,103 sexual affairs,104 sexual 
activities105 and, in an appropriate case, the identity of persons.106 These latter 
matters are of a kind that may also satisfy Chief Justice Gleeson’s test of private 
matters as ‘kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, applying contemporary 
standards of morals and behaviour, would understand to be meant to be 
                                                
97  Ibid [161]. 
98  (2001) 208 CLR 199, 255 [123]. 
99  Ibid 224 [34]. 
100  (2008) 24 VR 1, 35–6 [167]–[168] (Ashley JA), 107 [450]–[452] (Neave JA). 
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unobserved … [the disclosure of which would be] highly offensive to a 
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.’107 Thus private matters may also have 
the necessary quality of confidence.108 In the context of images captured by a 
camera mounted on a UAV, there are a wide range of matters that may be 
regarded as falling within the ambit of this definition. Prima facie, this includes 
persons engaging in an intimate activity such as nude or topless sunbathing, 
sexual encounters or surreptitiously urinating in the bush. 
Whether that information has been obtained in circumstances imparting an 
obligation of confidence will depend upon whether the circumstances are such 
that any reasonable person standing in the shoes of the recipient should have 
realised on reasonable grounds that the information was obtained in 
confidence. 109  In Lenah Game Meats, 110  Gleeson CJ approved the following 
statement by Laws J in Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire: 
If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and with no 
authority a picture of another engaged in some private act, his subsequent 
disclosure of the photograph would, in my judgment, as surely amount to a breach 
of confidence as if he had found or stolen a letter or diary in which the act was 
recounted and proceeded to publish it. In such a case, the law would protect what 
might reasonably be called a right of privacy, although the name accorded to the 
cause of action would be breach of confidence.111 
The Chief Justice also added that: 
If the activities filmed were private, then the law of breach of confidence is 
adequate to cover the case. I would regard images and sounds of private activities, 
recorded by the methods employed in the present case, as confidential. There 
would be an obligation of confidence upon the persons who obtained them, and 
upon those into whose possession they came, if they knew, or ought to have 
known, the manner in which they were obtained.112  
It would seem that when applied in the context of private matters, his Honour 
would support a degree of conflation of the first two elements of the cause of 
action. In other words, where an activity is private not only does it have a quality 
of confidence, any images captured of that activity give rise to the requisite 
obligation of confidence. In the context of cameras mounted on UAVs, any 
images of private activities captured would on this reasoning satisfy the first two 
requirements for an action for breach of confidence. The action would therefore 
be established if there were an actual or threatened disclosure, irrespective of 
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whether that disclosure was intentional or unintentional. Thus, the action would 
lie against, for example, the adolescent neighbour deliberately sharing with 
others any images captured of the sunbathing homeowner. It might equally 
extend to images of the same householder accidentally captured by a traffic 
report UAV broadcasting live to a television news audience or images of an 
amorous couple having a sexual encounter in the bush unintentionally captured 
by a search and rescue UAV broadcast live to its audience. As in the case of 
intrusion, the crucial question would therefore be what constitutes ‘private 
activities’ for these purposes. In other words, in terms suggested by Gleeson CJ, 
‘kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, applying contemporary standards 
of morals and behaviour, would understand to be meant to be unobserved … 
disclosure [of which] would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities’.113 
In the United States the disclosure tort has a defence based on public interest. 
The similar defence was adopted for the tort in New Zealand, and under the 
influences of article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights114 a claim 
for misuse of private information in the United Kingdom must be balanced 
against the public interest in free expression. Prior to this development English 
courts recognised a public interest defence to breaches of confidentiality, 
particularly in the case of personal secrets.115 By contrast, while there have been 
isolated suggestions in Australian courts that a public interest defence to a breach 
of confidence should be recognised in this country,116 the weight of authority still 
favours a narrower ‘iniquity’ defence.117 This defence was originally conceived in 
terms of crimes.118 It has more recently been variously described in terms of 
either a crime, a civil wrong or serious misdeed of public importance of a 
character of public importance, in the sense that what is being disclosed affects 
the community as a whole or affects the public welfare;119 matters the disclosure 
of which would ‘protect the community from destruction, damage or harm’;120 or 
of ‘matters, carried out or contemplated, in breach of the country’s security, or in 
breach of law, including statutory duty, fraud, or otherwise destructive of the 
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country or its people, including matters medically dangerous to the public; and 
doubtless other misdeeds of similar gravity.’121 Thus, in Australia while there 
may be a defence for the disclosure of images of, for example, drug cultivation or 
some other nefarious activity which may be captured by a camera mounted on a 
UAV (assuming those activities may be regarded as private), in other cases the 
iniquity defence is likely to be of little assistance to the operator of a UAV. 
In Lenah Game Meats, Gleeson CJ observed that if the action for breach  
of confidence were applied in a privacy context it would be necessary to give 
effect to the constitutional freedom of government or political communication.122 
As first recognised in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 123  the 
Australian Constitution protects the freedom of communication between the 
people concerning political or government matters, which enables them to 
exercise a free and informed choice as electors. ‘Political or government matters’ 
on a narrow interpretation extends to discussion concerning the suitability of an 
individual for public office124 and those seeking public office125 and the public 
conduct of persons who are engaged in activities that have become the subject of 
political debate, including trade union leaders, Aboriginal political leaders, and 
perhaps political and economic commentators.126 On a wide interpretation it could 
embrace ‘social and economic features of Australian society’ since they are 
matters potentially within the purview of government.127  Thus, in order for  
an action for breach of confidence to be appropriate and adapted to serve the 
system of government prescribed by the Australian Constitution it would be 
necessary to recognise, in addition to an iniquity defence, a defence allowing  
free communication concerning government or political matters. Accordingly, if 
a camera mounted on a UAV were to capture images of, for example, a 
politician, candidate or other political figure engaging in a private activity, which 
contradicts that person’s public platform or otherwise compromises them in the 
execution of their public duties, then disclosure of those images may be protected 
by the constitutional freedom of communication regarding government or 
political matters. 
However, the need to preserve coherency in the law adds another layer of 
complexity to this issue. Preserving coherency requires that Australian courts not 
recognise a novel claim where to do so would encroach upon an established 
                                                
121 Beloff v Pressdram Ltd [1973] 1 All ER 241, 260 (Ungoed-Thomas J), cited with approval in Castrol 
Australia Pty Ltd v Emtech Associates Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 31, 55 (Rath J). See also Church of 
Scientology of California v Kaufman [1973] RPC 635, 648–9 (Goff J). 
122  (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224 [35]. 
123  (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
124  See, eg, Peterson v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1995) 64 SASR 152; Brander v Ryan (2000) 78 SASR 
234. 
125  Brander v Ryan (2000) 78 SASR 234, 249 [110] (Lander J). 
126  Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 124 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron 
JJ). 
127  Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 544 [49] (French CJ).  
454 UNSW Law Journal Volume 37(2) 
cause of action.128 Thus a breach of confidence that in the course of invading a 
person’s privacy also conveys innuendo about the subject may more properly be 
the province of the law of defamation, with its careful balance between 
reputation and free speech, including defences such as truth, the extended 
common law qualified privilege129 and statutory qualified privilege.130 The second 
and third of these include a requirement that the publisher’s conduct be 
reasonable in the circumstances, judged by a set of guidelines that include the 
extent to which the published matter is in the public interest and whether the 
matter published concerns the performance of the public functions or activities of 
the person.131 
The English case Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd,132 demonstrates that 
disclosures of private activities may take different forms. In that case, the head of 
world Formula 1 motor racing and son of the wartime fascist leader Oswald 
Mosley sued a newspaper for reporting that he had participated in a ‘Nazi orgy’, 
which Mosley instead insisted was sadomasochistic activities between consenting 
adults. Mosley successfully sued for breach of privacy, Eady J deciding that the 
only possible public interest in the circumstances that could have outweighed the 
plaintiff’s ‘fairly obvious’ right to privacy was the alleged Nazi role-play and 
mockery of Holocaust victims by a person in such an influential position but  
that there was no evidence that such elements formed part of the event.133 His 
Honour thought that when determining whether the public interest in free 
expression outweighed the reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of a 
newspaper publication which disclosed the plaintiff’s private activities, a 
requirement of ‘responsible journalism’ determined in accordance with the 
guidelines propounded by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd134 
was appropriate. 135  Had the case arisen in Australia, the disclosure of the 
sadomasochistic activities combined with the assertions of Nazi overtones, or 
some other innuendo, would have been a reflection on the plaintiff’s reputation 
and therefore more properly been the province of defamation law rather than an 
action for breach of confidence or a distinct disclosure tort. 
                                                
128  Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 581 [55] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Hayne and Callinan 
JJ). 
129  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 571–4 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, and Kirby JJ). 
130  Civil Laws (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 139A; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 30; Defamation Act 2006 
(NT) s 27; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 30; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 28; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) 
s 30; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 30; Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 30. 
131  Civil Laws (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 139A(3)(a)–(b); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 30(3)(a)–(b); 
Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 27(3)(a)–(b); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 30(3)(a)–(b); Defamation Act 
2005 (SA) s 28(3)(a)–(b); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 30(3)(a)–(b); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 
30(3)(a)–(b); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 30(3)(a)–(b). 
132 [2008] EMLR 20. 
133  Ibid 713 [122]–[123]. 
134  [2001] 2 AC 127, 205; see also Jameel (Mohammed) v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2007] 1 AC 359.  
135  Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EMLR 20, 718 [140]. 
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Images captured by a camera mounted on a UAV may be disclosed to others 
deliberately (whether motivated by a desire to expose hypocrisy, cause mischief 
or some other reason) or by accident. Where that disclosure is accompanied by 
innuendo reflecting on the reputation of the person filmed, such a case should 
attract the tort of defamation. This may be thought of as more likely in the case 
of deliberate disclosures but need not be so. Where the disclosure is accidental it 
is still possible for that publication to convey innuendo. It is worth bearing in 
mind in this context that the publisher’s intention or motive is irrelevant to the 
question of whether published material is defamatory or not.136 Only where no 
innuendo is conveyed would the matter fall to be determined as an invasion of 
privacy, whether by means of an action of breach of confidence or by a distinct 
disclosure tort. In the case of the former cause of action, it has now been held that 
damages are available for mere distress.137 
In the case of deliberate disclosure where no innuendo is conveyed, which 
might occur where, for example, an adolescent neighbour films a sunbather and 
then uploads the captured images to the internet, it may be that an action based 
on Wilkinson v Downton138 will provide a remedy for some invasions of privacy. 
As noted, the possibility of such an action applying was recognised by Gummow 
and Hayne JJ in Lenah Game Meats.139  In Wilkinson, a case involving Mr 
Downton telling Mrs Wilkinson as a prank that her husband had been in an 
accident and that she should go to him, Wright J held that the defendant was 
liable for having ‘wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the 
plaintiff’, since the defendant’s act was ‘so plainly calculated to produce some 
effect of the kind which was produced that an intention to produce it ought to be 
imputed to the defendant’.140 It was immaterial that more harm was done than 
was expected or anticipated since ‘that is commonly the case with all wrongs.’141 
Wilkinson led to an extensive body of case law in the United States, where 
the action is styled as an intentional infliction of emotional distress but balanced 
by a requirement that the defendant must have engaged in ‘extreme and 
outrageous behaviour.’142 However, the cause of action has had less of an impact 
in Anglo-Australian law, perhaps due to the insistence upon damage in the form 
of longer lasting psychiatric harm rather than mere distress. 143  Indeed, in 
Wainwright v Home Office,144 Lord Hoffmann (with whom the other Law Lords 
agreed) suggested that in cases of psychiatric injury there was no point in seeking 
to rely on intention when negligence will do just as well.145 Wilkinson was 
                                                
136 Lee v Wilson (1934) 51 CLR 276, 288 (Dixon J). 
137  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, 34 [159] (Ashley JA), 100 [424] (Neave JA). 
138  [1897] 2 QB 57 (‘Wilkinson’). 
139  (2001) 208 CLR 255 [123]. 
140  [1897] 2 QB 57, 58–9. 
141  Ibid 59. 
142  American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) § 46. 
143  See, eg, Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383, 394 (Windeyer J). 
144  [2004] 2 AC 406 (‘Wainwright’). 
145  Ibid 425 [40]. 
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therefore left with ‘no leading role in the modern law.’146 He noted that the case 
was decided at a time when the Privy Council decision in Victorian Railway 
Commissioners v Coultas147 was authority for the view that nervous shock was 
too remote a consequence of a negligent act to be a recoverable head of damage. 
His Lordship thought that it was evident that the decision in Wilkinson, by being 
based on intention, was an attempt to evade Coultas. However, its reliance on 
intention was dubious since Mr Downton, in telling Mrs Wilkinson as a prank 
that her husband had been in an accident, in fact only intended to cause Mrs 
Wilkinson to suffer a fright, not any resulting illness. When the rule in Wilkinson 
was next considered,148 Coultas was no longer good authority and Wilkinson was 
able to be comfortably accommodated by the law concerning nervous shock 
caused by negligence. Lord Hoffmann thought that while it was true that a tort of 
intention would not involve the policy considerations which gave rise to the 
limits on claims for negligence, the defendant must actually have acted in a way 
which he or she knew to be unjustifiable and intended to cause harm or at least 
acted without caring whether he or she caused harm or not.149 In his view, the 
kind of imputed intention verging on negligence held to be sufficient in 
Wilkinson itself would not do.150 
In Australia, intentional harm was first considered in Bunyan v Jordan.151 
This case involved a defendant who announced that he was going to kill himself 
and who then discharged a firearm in a nearby office, thereby causing a co-
worker to suffer a shock. Chief Justice Latham thought that if a person 
‘deliberately does an act of a kind calculated to cause physical injury ... and in 
fact causes physical injury to that other person, he is liable in damages.’152 The 
word ‘calculated’ was held to mean objectively likely to happen.153 Subsequently, 
in Northern Territory v Mengel154 it was said that Wilkinson illustrated ‘acts 
which are calculated in the ordinary course to cause harm ... or which are done 
with reckless indifference to the harm that is likely to ensue’.155 As such the cause 
of action would seem to be an instance where, as Peter Cane suggested, intention 
includes recklessness in the sense of a conscious indifference to the risk of the 
outcome occurring since in either case the person engaging in the conduct will 
have done so deliberately.156  
                                                
146  Ibid 425 [41]. 
147  (1888) 13 App Cas 222 (‘Coultas’). 
148  Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316. 
149  Wainwright [2004] 2 AC 406, 426 [45]. 
150  [2004] 2 AC 406, 425 [44]. 
151  (1937) 57 CLR 1. 
152  Ibid, 10 (citations omitted). 
153  Ibid 10–11 (Latham CJ), 17 (Dixon J). 
154  (1995) 185 CLR 307. 
155  Ibid 347 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Tooehy, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
156  Cane, above n 78, 545. 
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By contrast, in Carrier v Bonham157 McPherson JA (with whom McMurdo P 
and Moynihan J agreed) viewed Wilkinson as an instance of an intentional act 
which had reasonably foreseeable consequences that were apparently not in fact 
foreseen by the defendant in all their severity. This was, in his Honour’s view, no 
different from most everyday acts that are called actionable negligence and 
which are in fact wholly or partly a product of intentional conduct, such as 
intentionally driving a motor vehicle at high speed through a residential area, 
even if injuring people or property on the way was not a result actually intended. 
His Honour thought that it no longer mattered whether the act was done 
intentionally or negligently, or partly one and partly the other, since what matters 
is whether the consequences of conduct, whether foreseen or not, are reasonably 
foreseeable and are such as should be averted or avoided. There was only one tort 
for a failure to use reasonable care which caused damage.158 On this analysis, like 
that of the House of Lords in Wainwright, the cause of action recognised in 
Wilkinson should be regarded as having been subsumed into negligence, and 
should therefore be subject to limits such as the need to show a recognisable 
psychiatric illness159 and, in some jurisdictions, for it to be reasonably foreseeable 
that the plaintiff’s reaction was that of a person of normal fortitude.160  
Accordingly, if an action based on Wilkinson is still available in Australia,161 
a person whose image was captured by a camera mounted on a UAV and then 
widely disclosed may have a claim not only if that disclosure was done with an 
intention to cause harm but also if there is reckless indifference to the likely 
harm, as may occur where the disclosure is part of a prank. On the contrary 
analysis represented by the judgments in Wainwright and Carrier, the 
appropriate cause of action is now negligence. The person whose image has been 
captured through use of a UAV would be required to show a duty of care in the 
circumstances and damage resulting from a breach of that duty in the form of 
recognisable psychiatric illness, as opposed to reactions such as mere 
humiliation, embarrassment or emotional stress. 
 
D    Privacy and Statute 
Both the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) and New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission (‘NSWLRC’) have recommended the 
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159 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 382 [193] (Gummow and Kirby JJ). See also Civil Law 
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enactment of a statutory cause of action protecting personal privacy.162 In the 
ALRC formulation, such a cause of action would arise in circumstances where it 
can be said that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy and the act or 
conduct complained of would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities.163 Such an expectation, if established, would be balanced 
against other public interests, such as the interest of the public in being informed 
about matters of public concern or the public interest in allowing freedom of 
expression.164 A statutory cause of action in this form may be apt to provide a 
remedy in cases of intrusion and/or disclosure involving images captured by a 
camera mounted on a UAV. Until such a cause of action is enacted, there are 
three types of statute that may be relevant to these types of invasion of privacy. 
 
1 Surveillance Devices Statutes 
Only New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory have replaced their listening devices statutes with legislation governing 
optical surveillance devices and the communication or publication of recordings 
made by such devices.165 However, the approaches taken in these statutes are not 
uniform. These differences may have significance in the circumstances of images 
captured by a camera mounted on a UAV. 
 
(a) New South Wales 
In New South Wales, the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) section 8(1) 
provides that 
a person must not knowingly install, use or maintain an optical surveillance device 
on or within premises or a vehicle or on any other object, to record visually or 
observe the carrying on of an activity if the installation, use or maintenance of the 
device involves: 
(a) entry onto or into the premises or vehicle without the express or implied 
consent of the owner or occupier of the premises or vehicle, or  
                                                
162  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report No 108 (2008) 88 (‘For Your Information Report’); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 
Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) 4–5 [1.5] (‘Invasion of Privacy Report’).  
163  For Your Information Report, above n 162, 2568–9 [74.134]–[74.135]. 
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that invaded the privacy that an individual was reasonably entitled to expect in all the circumstances 
having regard to any public interest: Invasion of Privacy Report, above n 162, 22–3 [5.1]–[5.3]. Thus, 
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countervailing public interest under the ALRC model, the NSWLRC model would require the public 
interest to be taken into account when determining whether there was a right to privacy in the first place. 
The difference in approach affects the onus of proof in relation to the public interest. Under the ALRC 
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Invasion of Privacy Report, above n 162, 28 [5.17]. 
165  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NT); Surveillance Devices Act 
1999 (Vic); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA). 
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(b) interference with the vehicle or other object without the express or implied 
consent of the person having lawful possession or lawful control of the 
vehicle or object.  
‘Premises’ are defined as including land 166  while ‘vehicle’ includes an 
aircraft.167 
The application of these provisions to a case involving a UAV is not without 
difficulty. The requirement of a ‘knowing’ installation or use to record the 
carrying on of an activity will mean that the section does not apply where, for 
example, a UAV operated for search and rescue purposes over land with the 
owner’s consent were to unintentionally capture images of a couple engaging in 
intimate activities instead of the lost person. The section will therefore only apply 
to the deliberate use of a UAV to invade another’s privacy. 
It could be said that mounting a camera on a UAV amounts to installation or 
use of an optical surveillance device ‘on … a vehicle’.168 However, mounting a 
camera on one’s own UAV does not involve ‘entry onto or into the … vehicle 
without the express or implied consent of the owner’169 or ‘interference with the 
vehicle … without the express or implied consent of the person having lawful 
possession or lawful control of the vehicle’.170 Accordingly, that aspect of the 
section may be appropriate for, for example, surveillance devices installed in a 
motor vehicle but not one mounted on a UAV. 
On the other hand, in a case such as the adolescent neighbour mounting a 
camera on a UAV to spy on the sunbathing homeowner there may be a use of an 
optical surveillance device ‘on or within premises … to record visually or 
observe the carrying on of an activity’.171 If the adolescent neighbour were to fly 
the UAV over the homeowner’s premises then there may be an ‘entry onto or 
into premises without the express or implied consent of the owner or occupier’.172 
However, if the adolescent neighbour were to hover the UAV over his or her own 
side of the fence in order to record visually or observe the activities on the other 
side, this section would not be breached even though the invasion of privacy may 
have no less occurred. 
 
(b) Victoria 
In Victoria, the Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) section 7(1) provides 
that 
a person must not knowingly install, use or maintain an optical surveillance device 
to record visually or observe a private activity to which the person is not a party, 
without the express or implied consent of each party to the activity.  
                                                
166  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 4 (definition of ‘premises’). 
167  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 4 (definition of ‘vehicle’). 
168  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 8(1). 
169  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 8(1)(a). 
170  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 8(1)(b). 
171  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 8(1). 
172  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 8(1)(a). 
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A ‘private activity’ is defined as  
an activity carried on in circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate 
that the parties to it desire it to be observed only by themselves, but does not 
include: 
(a) an activity carried on outside a building; or 
(b) an activity carried on in any circumstances in which the parties to it ought 
reasonably to expect that it may be observed by someone else.173 
Thus, the section would apply if, for example, the adolescent neighbour flew 
the UAV on either side of the fence in order to record or observe activities 
occurring inside the house next door, provided those activities were not occurring 
in plain sight from outside so that the parties to it ‘ought reasonably to expect 
that it may be observed’.174 However, in the posited case of a homeowner 
sunbathing in his or her backyard behind a high fence, or for that matter, an 
individual filmed while he or she was involved in an intimate activity in 
bushland, those activities would be ‘carried on outside a building’ 175  and 
therefore not fall within the ambit of the section. 
 
(c) Northern Territory and Western Australia 
In the Northern Territory the prohibition is similar to that in Victoria. 
Surveillance Devices Act (NT) section 12(1) provides that  
a person is guilty of an offence if the person: 
(a) installs, uses or maintains an optical surveillance device to monitor, record 
visually or observe a private activity to which the person is not a party; and  
(b)  knows the device is installed, used or maintained without the express or 
implied consent of each party to the activity. 
By contrast, Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) section 6(1) is worded 
differently. It provides that  
a person shall not install, use, or maintain, or cause to be installed, used, or 
maintained, an optical surveillance device –  
(a) to record visually or observe a private activity to which that person is not a 
party or  
(b)  to record visually or observe a private activity to which that person is a party. 
However, both statutes define ‘private activity’ as  
an activity carried on in circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate 
the parties to the activity desire it to be observed only by themselves, but does not 
include an activity carried on in circumstances in which the parties to the activity 
ought reasonably to expect the activity may be observed by someone else.176  
This definition may therefore be contrasted with that in Victoria and may 
embrace private activities occurring outdoors, such as sunbathing in a backyard 
                                                
173  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3 (definition of ‘private activity’). 
174  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3 (definition of ‘private activity’) para (b). 
175  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3 (definition of ‘private activity’) para (a). 
176  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NT) s 4 (definition of ‘private act’). The WA legislation is substantially 
similar: Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 3 (definition of ‘private act’). 
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or on a private beach or engaging in intimate activities in the bush where those 
activities were carried on in an area where they ‘ought reasonably to expect the 
activity may be observed by someone else’.177 
In both jurisdictions the prohibition against the use of an optical surveillance 
device to record or observe a private activity is supported by a prohibition against 
communication or publication of a record of that activity.178 However, there are a 
number of exceptions to this prohibition, including communications or 
publications reasonably necessary in the public interest or in the course of legal 
proceedings.179 Such exemptions might apply where, for example, there is a 
disclosure of illegal activities, such as drug cultivation in the bush or drug 
dealing inside a home, which is captured by camera mounted on a UAV. 
 
2 Protection of Personal Information 
Images captured by a camera mounted on a UAV may also be subject to 
regimes governing the collection, use or disclosure of personal information. The 
relevant regime depends upon whether the user of the UAV is a private 
organisation or a Commonwealth or state/territory government agency. None of 
the regimes apply where the operator of the UAV is a private individual. 
Australia is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,180 which requires contracting states to ensure that their domestic legal 
systems provide adequate protection against interference with privacy. This 
obligation was given effect by the enactment of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
(‘Privacy Act’), which established the office of Privacy Commissioner, and 
provided a code for the protection of privacy of information which originally 
consisted of 11 Information Privacy Principles (‘IPPs’) governing, inter alia, the 
collection, use and disclosure of ‘personal information’. These principles applied 
to Commonwealth and ACT government agencies. The IPPs have also been 
enacted by the Northern Territory181 and most of the states182 with the exception 
of South Australia, where they are applied by way of a government 
administrative order,183 and Western Australia, which currently has no legislative 
privacy regime governing its public sector.184  These regimes apply to their 
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respective state or territory government agencies. Subsequently it was recognised 
that government agencies were not the only organisations that collected private 
information. Accordingly, the Commonwealth government amended the Privacy 
Act to enact a different set of principles, called the National Privacy Principles 
(‘NPPs’), which were based on the IPPs and in some cases used the same 
wording but contained a number of inconsistencies and did not even use the  
same numbering.185  These principles applied solely to private organisations.  
After a recommendation by the ALRC, the Commonwealth government sought  
to address the inconsistencies between the IPPs and NPPs in the Privacy  
Act by replacing both with a new set of principles, called the Australian  
Privacy Principles (‘APPs’), which apply equally to Commonwealth and ACT 
government agencies and private organisations,186 although most small business 
organisations with a turnover of $3 million or less187 and journalists188 are exempt. 
These principles came into effect on 12 March 2014. 
These regimes generally define ‘personal information’ as meaning 
information or opinion, whether true or false, about an individual whose identity 
is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion.189  
It has been held that a photograph or video of an individual constitutes ‘personal 
information’ about that individual. 190  Accordingly, a government agency or 
private organisation which operates a UAV on which a camera is mounted and 
which captures images of individuals will be obliged to comply with the relevant 
personal information regime in relation to, for example, the collection, use and 
disclosure of those images. 
All personal information regimes limit the circumstances in which that 
information may be collected. However, those limits are expressed differently. 
The Commonwealth APP, New South Wales and Queensland regimes provide 
that personal information must not be collected unless for a purpose that is a 
lawful purpose directly related to a function or activity of the agency and the 
collection of the information is necessary for or directly related to that purpose.191 
By contrast, in Tasmania, the Northern Territory and Victoria an agency must not 
collect personal information unless the information is necessary for one or more 
of its functions or activities.192 The South Australian administrative instruction 
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states that personal information should not be collected ‘unnecessarily’.193 These 
various regimes further require that personal information must not be collected 
by unlawful194 or unlawful or unfair means;195 be collected only by lawful and fair 
means and not in an unreasonably intrusive way,196 be collected only by lawful 
and fair means197 or be collected by lawful means.198 
Depending on the circumstances it may be difficult to show that images 
inadvertently captured by a camera mounted on a UAV were ‘directly related to a 
function or activity of the agency’ or ‘necessary for one or more of its functions 
or activities’. In the case of a UAV monitoring vegetation, the activities of 
persons venturing into that vegetation and impacting upon it in some way may be 
related to that purpose, even where those activities were intimate or of a kind 
they would prefer not be observed. However, in other cases, such as UAVs 
involved in film-making or search and rescue operations, it may be more 
difficult. In addition, it has been seen that Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 
(Cth) provide that a UAV cannot be legally operated within 30 metres of a person 
who is not involved the operation of the UAV and must not be operated over 
populous areas.199 Further, a small UAV can only operate in areas outside those 
approved by the CASA if, where the UAV operates greater than 400 feet  
above ground level, the operator has CASA’s approval to do so and the UAV 
stays clear of populous areas.200 Accordingly, any images captured by a camera 
mounted on a UAV which has been operated contrary to these regulations 
arguably will have been collected by means which are not lawful. In addition, it 
may be argued that filming an individual from the air without that person’s 
knowledge or warning may mean that that information has not been collected by 
fair means. 
The Commonwealth APP regime has also introduced a new concept of 
‘unsolicited personal information’. Where an agency or organisation receives 
unsolicited information, and it is information that could not be validly collected if 
it had been solicited, there is an obligation to destroy the information or ensure 
that the information is de-identified if it is lawful and reasonable to do so.201 The 
application of these provisions to images captured by a camera mounted on a 
UAV is not without difficulty. It may be possible to argue that images captured 
by a camera mounted on a UAV operated by a private organisation or 
Commonwealth or ACT agency should instead be regarded as ‘unsolicited’ in the 
sense of being unintended or accidentally acquired. However, if ‘unsolicited’ 
                                                
193  Department of Premier and Cabinet (SA), Cabinet Administrative Instruction 1/89, 5 August 2013 para 
4(1). 
194  Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 8(2). 
195  Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld), sch 3 s 1(2). 
196  Information Act 2002 (NT) sch 2 sub-cl 1.2; Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) sch 1 sub-cl 1.2. 
197  Privacy Act sch 1 pt 2 sub-cl 3.5. 
198  Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas) sch 1 cl 1(2). 
199  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) regs 101.245, 101.280. 
200  Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) regs 101.245, 101.250. 
201  Privacy Act sch 1 pt 2 cl 4. 
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instead denotes a passive role, essentially being given something that was not 
asked for, it would not appear to embrace the operation of a UAV for the purpose 
of observing and/or recording activities on the ground. 
Further, in some jurisdictions where an agency or organisation collects 
personal information from an individual it must take such steps ‘as are reasonable 
in the circumstances’ to ensure that, before the information is collected or as soon 
as practicable after collection, the individual to whom the information relates is 
made aware of various matters including the fact that the information is being 
collected, the purposes for the collection, the intended recipients of the 
information, the existence of any right of access to the information, and the 
agency that is holding the information.202 However, where the images captured by 
a camera mounted on a UAV involve subjects who are unaware that they are 
being filmed,203 the images cannot be said to have been collected from them. In 
any event, unless the individual who has been filmed from the air is a person who 
is known to the operator or is otherwise readily identifiable it may not be possible 
to track that person down in order to advise him or her that his or her image has 
been collected. 
While all jurisdictions place limits on agencies or organisations disclosing 
personal information that they have collected, there are also exceptions where 
disclosure is permitted. Once again there are differences between the regimes. 
However, most regimes allow disclosure where, for example, the agency or 
organisation reasonably believes that it is reasonably necessary for the 
prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution or publish of criminal offences 
or breaches of a law imposing a penalty or sanction.204 For example, if a camera 
mounted on a UAV operated by a country fire service for the purposes of 
monitoring firebreaks or tracking bushfires were to inadvertently capture images 
of clandestine drug cultivation, the disclosure of those images to police or other 
legal authorities for the purposes of investigation or prosecution would be 
exempted under the legislation. Similarly, footage of a traffic offence captured by 
a camera mounted on a UAV operated by a film company for a television or 
movie production could be disclosed to police or other authorities for the same 
purposes. Exemptions in some regimes also allow disclosure where the agency or 
organisation reasonably believes that the disclosure is necessary to lessen or 
prevent a serious and imminent threat to an individual’s life, health, safety or 
                                                
202  Privacy Act sch 1 pt 2 cl 5; Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 10; 
Information Act 2002 (NT) sch 2 sub-cl 1.3; Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas) sch 1 cl 
1(3); Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) sch 1 sub-cl 1.3. See also Department of Premier and Cabinet 
(SA), Cabinet Administrative Instruction 1/89, 5 August 2013 para 4(2). 
203  Cf SW v Forests NSW [2006] NSWADT 74 (complainant was aware that she was being photographed at a 
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204  See Privacy Act s 16A(1) item 2, sch 1 pt 3 sub-cls 6.1, 6.2(c); Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 23(5); Information Act 2002 (NT) sch 2 sub-cl 2.1(g); Information Privacy 
Act 2009 (Qld) sch 3 s 11(1)(e); Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas) sch 1 cl 2(1)(g); 
Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) sch 1 sub-cl 2.1(g). See also Department of Premier and Cabinet 
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welfare; or a serious threat to public health, public safety, or public welfare.205 
The exemptions in other jurisdictions are limited to lessening or preventing 
serious and imminent threat to life or health only.206  
There are generally no exemptions in any of the regimes that would permit 
disclosures of images of individuals engaging in more innocent behaviour such 
as engaging in intimate activities or sunbathing in a backyard or on a beach. 
However, the Commonwealth APP regime has introduced new exemptions for 
use or disclosure that is reasonably necessary to assist in the location of a person 
who has been reported as missing; the establishment, exercise or defence of a 
legal or equitable claim; or for the purposes of a confidential alternative dispute 
resolution process.207 Accordingly if, for example, an individual filmed engaging 
in intimate activities was a person who had been reported missing, or if those 
intimate activities consisted of a sexual liaison that was relevant to a legal or 
equitable claim or confidential alternative dispute resolution, disclosure may be 
permitted. 
 
3 Filming and Voyeurism Offences 
Concerns about the misuse of technology to ‘upskirt’, that is surreptitiously 
take photographs underneath clothing, and recognition that such devices might be 
used surreptitiously to take photographs in public change rooms and swimming 
pools prompted discussion by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General with 
a view to developing uniform laws to address such behaviour. 208  Several 
jurisdictions took steps to outlaw such conduct, some casting their legislation in 
terms wide enough to apply to other conduct as well, including some cases 
involving images captured by camera is mounted on UAVs.209 The legislation in 
Queensland, South Australia and New South Wales in particular warrant 
examination. 
 
(a) Queensland 
Queensland amended its Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) by inserting section 
227A(1), which prohibits a person from observing or visually recording another 
person ‘in circumstances where a reasonable adult would expect to be afforded 
privacy’ without the other person’s consent and when the other person  
(a) is in a private place, or 
                                                
205  Privacy Act s 16A(1) item 1, sch 1 pt 3 sub-cls 6.1, 6.2 para (c); Information Act 2002 (NT) sch 2 sub-cl 
2.1(d); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) sch 3 s 11(1)(c); Personal Information Protection Act 2004 
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466 UNSW Law Journal Volume 37(2) 
(b)  is engaging in a private act and the observation or visual recording is made 
for the purpose of observing or visually recording a private act.210 
Section 227A is supported by section 227B, which prohibits the ‘distribution’ 
(which includes communication of transmission) of a prohibited visual recording 
of another person without his or her consent. 
The Queensland Attorney-General Linda Lavarch, in the second reading 
speech of the amendment bill noted that ‘[t]he motivation of the observer will be 
irrelevant – that is, whether the observer’s motives are for sexual gratification, to 
harass the person observed, or for a commercial purpose.’211 The section provides 
as examples of ‘circumstances where a reasonable adult would expect to be 
afforded privacy’ persons using a communal change room at a swimming pool 
and persons who need help to dress or use a toilet. However, examples that are 
provided in legislation are not definitive interpretation of that legislation.212 
Section 227A(1)(b) is limited to intentional observing or recording a private act 
in circumstances where a reasonable adult would expect to be afforded privacy, 
such as the voyeuristic adolescent using a UAV to film the neighbour sunbathing 
next door, and would therefore not apply to accidental recordings such as those 
made by a camera mounted on a UAV being operated for other purposes such as 
traffic reports, search and rescue or crop monitoring. However, there is no such 
limitation on section 227A(1)(a). In particular, ‘private place’ may not be limited 
to, for example, a place indoors. Accordingly, even accidental filming of persons 
engaging in intimate activities such as sexual encounters or urination in a private 
place outdoors, such as a place in bushland, in circumstances where they would 
expect to be afforded privacy, may breach the section. The coverage of the 
section is therefore potentially wide. 
 
(b) South Australia 
In May 2013 South Australia amended its Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) 
to introduce a new part 5A concerning filming offences. 213  Section 26D(1) 
provides that ‘[a] person must not engage in indecent filming’, which is defined 
in section 26A to mean filming of either: 
(a) another person in a state of undress in circumstances in which a reasonable 
person would expect to be afforded privacy; or  
(b) another person engaged in a private act in circumstances in which a 
reasonable person would expect to be afforded privacy; or  
(c) another person’s private region in circumstances in which a reasonable 
person would not expect that the person’s private region might be filmed. 
                                                
210  The section also provides for an offence where a person observes or visually records another person’s 
genital or anal region without the other person’s consent: Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 227A(2). This 
offence will catch conduct in the nature of upskirting. 
211  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 November 2005, 3745 (Linda Lavarch, 
Attorney-General).  
212  Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 14D. 
213  Summary Offences (Filming Offences) Amendment Act 2013 (SA). 
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‘Private act’ is further defined by the section to mean: 
(a) a sexual act of a kind not ordinarily done in public; or  
(b) using a toilet. 
It is a defence if the filming occurred with the consent of the person being 
filmed or if it was undertaken by licensed investigation agent in the course of 
obtaining evidence in connection with a claim for compensation, damages, 
payment under a contract or some other benefit.214 
This is supported by section 26D(3) which provides that ‘[a] person must not 
distribute a moving or still image obtained by indecent filming.’ A person will 
have a defence to this offence where the person filmed consented to the 
distribution, the defendant did not know and could not reasonably be expected to 
know that the indecent filming was without person’s consent, or the filming was 
undertaken by a licensed investigation agent.215 
These offences may therefore be relevant to where, for example, a UAV is 
used to spy on a neighbour sunbathing in the presumed privacy of his or her 
backyard or engaging in sexual activities (indoors or outdoors in circumstances 
in which a reasonable person would expect privacy). It could also conceivably 
extend to filming of persons in public places such as bushland where that person 
is in a state of undress or engaging in sexual activity in circumstances in which a 
reasonable person would expect to be afforded privacy. It would therefore not 
apply in the case of a person in a state of undress or engaging in a sexual activity 
in a public region open to public view, such as a beach or bushland adjacent to a 
public thoroughfare. 
Additional protection is provided by section 26C, which prohibits a person 
from distributing an ‘invasive image’ of another person 
knowing or having reason to believe that the other person–  
(a) does not consent to that particular distribution of the image; or  
(b) does not consent to that particular distribution of the image and does not 
consent to distribution of the image generally. 
‘Invasive image’ is defined in section 26A to mean:  
a moving or still image of a person– 
(a) engaged in a private act; or  
(b) in a state of undress such that the person’s bare genital or anal region is 
visible. 
but does not include an image of a person under, or apparently under, the age of 
16 years216 or an image of a person who is in a public place. 
Unlike the offence in section 26D(3), due to this exclusion in the definition of 
‘invasive image’ the section will not apply to images of a person in any public 
place, including those places where a reasonable person may still expect to be 
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afforded privacy, such as where a person engages in a sexual activity in bushland 
well away from normal public view. 
 
(c) New South Wales 
Initially New South Wales inserted laws designed to address upskirting and 
the other surreptitious filming into the Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW).217 
These provisions have now been replaced by new provisions in the Crimes Act 
1900 (NSW) division 15B dealing with ‘voyeurism’ and other related offences. 
Section 91K prohibits a person filming another person who is engaged in a 
‘private act’, which is defined by section 91I to mean where: 
(a) the person is in a state of undress, using the toilet, showering or bathing, 
engaged in a sexual act of a kind not ordinarily done in public, or engaged in 
any other activity, and 
(b) the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would reasonably expect 
to be afforded privacy. 
While there are therefore similarities with the Queensland and South 
Australian provisions, the New South Wales provision is more limited in that it 
requires it to be shown that the filming was done for the purpose of obtaining, or 
enabling another person to obtain, sexual arousal or sexual gratification. It 
therefore would not apply to accidental filming or even some intentional filming 
where it cannot be proven to the requisite degree to have been done for that 
purpose. 
 
IV    CONCLUSION 
We are currently witnessing the dawn of the age of the drones. The Federal 
Aviation Administration in the United States has estimated that in that country 15 
000 civil and commercial drones could be flying by 2020, and as many as 30 000 
by 2030.218 A 2013 marketing study by a United States-based consulting firm has 
predicted that spending on UAVs in civil and defence will more than double over 
the next decade from current worldwide expenditures of US$5.2 billion annually 
to US$11.6 billion, or over US$89 billion over the next decade.219 The Deputy 
Director of CASA has relayed speculation by retailers that about 100 new multi-
rotors and fixed wing UAVs are now taking to Australian skies each week, most 
flown by ‘hobbyists’ who are not required to undertake training or register their 
aircraft.220 Precise records of numbers are impossible to keep since UAVs are 
often assembled locally from components ordered online from overseas. At the 
same time videos shot using cameras mounted on UAVs are also becoming 
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increasingly popular on video sharing websites such as YouTube.221 The potential 
for an increase in invasions of privacy using this technology is, as the Deputy 
Director acknowledged, a controversial issue that ‘has to be dealt with.’222 
At the same time, the current Australian legal landscape regarding personal 
privacy is an uneven patchwork of common law and statute at both 
Commonwealth and state/territory levels. It is not until this landscape of laws is 
viewed through the prism of a specific context, such as the potential for invasions 
of privacy by using cameras mounted on UAVs, that the many nuances of these 
laws can be made apparent and deficiencies laid bare. These deficiencies include 
a smattering of existing common law causes of action that may offer hope for 
reparation for aggrieved persons in particular circumstances, but which have 
limitations that leave undesirable lacunae in their utility. It also includes a 
disparate collection of statutes that, to a greater or lesser extent, apply to such 
conduct, in some cases more as a result of the terms in which they have been 
drafted rather than as their main objectives. Here there are many inconsistencies. 
Some jurisdictions have retained listening devices Acts more suited to more 
limited technological times now decades past, while some jurisdictions have 
advanced to surveillances devices legislation, albeit not in uniformity. Of the 
latter group, the surveillance devices statutes in the Northern Territory and 
Western Australia are best designed to address the spectre of technological 
invasions of privacy from the air. The other jurisdictions – including those that 
have already adopted more limited surveillance devices statutes – would do well 
to look to the legislation in these two jurisdictions as models for potential reform 
of their own legislation in order to address the changing times. A further 
deficiency in the legislation generally is that, in many or most cases, it only 
prohibits the relevant conduct. While in a democratic society the state may have 
an interest in preserving the autonomy of its citizens from invasions of their 
privacy, the value of such prohibitions may depend upon the willingness of the 
relevant authorities to prosecute transgressions. In any event, it is the individual 
who has his or her dignity or autonomy affronted that has the greater interest in 
preventing or redressing the wrong. Any appropriate legislative response should 
therefore make provision for reparation for individuals who have been aggrieved 
by invasions of their privacy. The mooted statutory cause of action currently 
being considered by the ALRC would be the best means of addressing not only 
the limitations of the common laws but also those of the various statutes that 
have relevance in this area. 
Justice Victor Windeyer of the High Court once described the law in the 
context of liability for psychiatric injury as ‘marching with medicine but in the 
rear and limping a little’.223 A similar observation might be made about the 
relationship between law and technology, although in some places and in some 
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respects the law may not so much be marching with a limp as dragging its heels. 
The dawn of the age of the drones and the potential it holds for bad as well as 
good provides a new challenge where the law needs to catch up in a quick and 
orderly fashion. 
 
 
 
